This paper considers how a firm's system of exchange skills including internal technical expertise and supplier governance mechanisms influence supplier performance, both independently and jointly. The core question is whether inter-firm governance mechanisms, including both relational and contractual mechanisms, can substitute for a firm's internal technical skills in maintaining supplier performance or, alternatively, whether a firm risks hollowing itself out by de-emphasizing internal expertise when it outsources. The arguments build on the capabilities, inter-organizational governance, and supply management literatures.
1
Firms need to ensure that they achieve strong performance from suppliers when they outsource goods and services, where outsourcing means using external vendors to supply goods and services needed for a firm's products. Dell, Nike, Boeing, Embraer, and Toyota rely heavily on relationships with suppliers to help them achieve industry leadership in price, quality, and responsiveness to changing demands. It is not clear, however, what skills firms require to achieve superior supplier performance. Some scholars emphasize inter-firm governance mechanisms in helping buyers achieve strong supplier performance, where inter-firm governance mechanisms include using contracts to specify terms and align incentives (Williamson, 1975; Macneil, 1978) as well as using relational governance mechanisms, such as sharing information and providing performance feedback, to increase commitment and generate common goals (Dyer, 1997; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Holcomb and Hitt, 2007) . Other analysts, though, point to the importance of a firm's own technical expertise, which is its understanding of the technology underlying its goods and services (Grant 1996) , and question whether buyers can rely primarily on inter-firm governance mechanisms to ensure satisfactory supplier performance. As Business Week (1986) asked more than twenty years ago and several scholars have echoed recently, do firms risk hollowing themselves out if they do not retain sufficient internal technical expertise to select, evaluate, and assist their suppliers (Richardson, 1993; Brusoni et al., 2001 )?
This study contributes to our understanding of how a firm's system of exchange skills (Macauley, 1963) contributes to effective supplier management. If governance mechanisms allow firms to substitute supplier expertise for their own skills, then firms might be able to increase their outsourcing activities to the point that they primarily become assemblers of purchased components and services or even pure contractual brokers. If governance mechanisms are not sufficient, however, firms that emphasize outsourcing without maintaining their own technical expertise might find themselves on downward spirals of unsatisfactory supplier relationships, becoming hollowed-out failures in their own end-product markets. Thus, we seek to determine whether firms can rely solely on suppliers' technical knowledge and achieve desired outcomes through contractual and relational governance mechanisms or whether firms must retain their own internal technical skills to be successful buyers.
Our work is the most systematic study to date of how technical expertise and governance mechanisms, including both relational and contractual governance, independently and jointly affect supplier performance. Case studies of aerospace and chemical firms by Brusoni and colleagues (2001) suggested that firms often "know more than they make", suggesting that firms' technical knowledge helps them be effective buyers, but this work did not go into detail about relational governance or consider contractual governance. Takeishi (2002) discussed the need for automotive buyers to have both architectural and component knowledge, but did not study governance. Dyer's work (1997; 2000) highlighted relational governance mechanisms in the auto industry and alluded to the importance of expertise and complementary capabilities with suppliers, but did not consider contracting. Mayer and Salomon (2006) studied how technical expertise can complement contracting by reducing hazards, but omitted relational governance.
Several scholars (Cannon et al., 2000; Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Carson et al., 2006; Cousins and Menguc, 2006) have investigated the interplay between relational and contractual governance, but none has also considered buyer expertise.
Dissecting the effects of expertise and governance on supplier performance is a complex undertaking. To better understand these relationships, we take two steps to leverage a rich dataset based on a large scale survey of small firms. First, we consider five distinct facets of supplier performance, including price, quality, delivery, cooperation, and communication. This multi-dimensional approach enables us to understand the distinct effects of expertise, contractual, and relational governance mechanisms on different types of performance, in contrast to prior work that typically studies only individual elements of performance. By considering these, we gain a nuanced view of the buyer/supplier relationship and uncover potential trade offs in performance. Second, we recognize the endogeneity problem of sourcing mode choice and performance. Buyers with considerable expertise may choose to produce internally, while buyers with superior skills in governance may choose to outsource. Our data allows us to control for this possibility through a two stage modeling process in which we first predict which firms will outsource and then incorporate this effect into the performance predictions (Hamilton and Nickerson, 2003) . This method is atypical for studies of supplier performance, but is vital to accurately understand this outcome.
Thus, our work contributes to the capabilities and supply management literatures by integrating the discussion of how governance and technical expertise can influence multiple dimensions of supplier performance, while controlling for firms' initial choice to outsource.
The next section provides illustrations of outsourcing and builds our theoretical predictions. We then describe our survey, which examines buyer-supplier relationships among 164 firms in the U.S. metal forming industry in 2002, and discuss methods of analysis. The results then demonstrate that technical expertise and relational governance directly and jointly improve multiple aspects of supplier performance. We conclude with implications and extensions of our findings that firms need capabilities in all three areas to manage suppliers effectively.
BACKGROUND AND PREDICTIONS

Examples of Outsourcing Successes and Difficulties
To illustrate how technical expertise may relate to contractual and relational governance mechanisms, we begin by discussing how several firms in the auto, computer, and footwear industries manage their suppliers. Toyota exemplifies a firm that emphasizes both relational governance activities and strong technical expertise. Toyota's relational governance activities allow the company to share information among suppliers while building high performance, longterm relationships. Enright (2003) , for instance, noted the importance of both contracts and relational governance processes in Toyota's supplier governance. In turn, the internal technical expertise means that the company can both evaluate suppliers effectively and help them move forward. As Liker (2004: 208) puts it, "Toyota believed that it needed to truly master any core technology in order to manage its suppliers effectively"; Liker used the example of semiconductor technology for hybrid cars, in which Toyota first developed its own technical expertise so that the company could outsource more effectively.
General Motors and Ford provide counter-point examples to Toyota. Both companies have high production expertise but have historically placed less emphasis on relational governance, especially regarding information sharing and developing collaborative, long-term supply relationships. As a result, these companies often can pressure their suppliers concerning price and quality, because they require high volumes and use detailed contracts to address cost and quality demands, but frequently struggle to maintain cooperative relationships that contribute to longer-term goals such as innovation (Enright, 2003) .
Dell is an example of a computer company that relies on external suppliers. To support their suppliers, Dell emphasizes both contractual and relational governance, typically contracting with partners and sharing information with them. At the same time, Dell historically maintained a pool of technical expertise rather than relying solely on supplier skills. Magretta (1998) notes that Dell's Research & Development group focuses on process and quality improvements in manufacturing and works closely with suppliers, both to evaluate supplier skills and to integrate them into Dell's "virtual integration" production process. Tan and Young (2003) also noted that Dell maintains the skills needed to assemble and test vendor procured parts and assemblies, again so that the company can both evaluate suppliers and help improve their processes.
Nike also uses suppliers extensively to generate high end-product performance. While Nike's attention to governing its partnerships receives some recognition (though much less recognition than its marketing strength), the importance of the company's own technical expertise receives much less attention. We discussed this study with a Nike executive, asking him about the importance of supplier governance and Nike's own technical expertise. He noted first that Nike undertakes extensive relational governance activities, with extensive quality, delivery, and cost auditing processes. The company both evaluates suppliers closely and presses them for quality and cost performance. Second, Nike typically uses contracts with its suppliers, often exceeding 15 years in length. Third, Nike has strong technical expertise in footwear and is responsible for advanced R&D, manufacturing R&D, and product development. Technical groups within the company provide a significant amount of direction to their suppliers. Much of the company's product and manufacturing innovation comes from groups at Nike headquarters or locations in Asia, where they have manufacturing directors in each location who assist suppliers on site. Nike also funds and runs learning centers, at which visiting suppliers learn manufacturing techniques, particularly principles of lean manufacturing. Finally, he noted that relational governance activity and technical expertise reinforce each other, particularly in generating cooperation.
These examples suggest that all three skills -internal technical expertise, contractual governance mechanisms, and relational governance mechanisms -can strengthen outsourcing performance. The next section discusses how these factors may influence supplier performance, individually and in combination.
Supplier Performance
Firms commonly produce a subset of the goods and services that make up their end products internally, while purchasing other services and physical components from external suppliers. Supplier performance affects buyer outcomes on several dimensions. The prices suppliers charge influence buyer profitability; over sixty percent of a firm's costs can arise from purchased components (Degraeve and Roodhooft, 2001 ). The quality of purchased items affects a buyer's production processes, the quality of its end products, and its reputation with customers (Womack et al., 1990; Mascarenhas et al., 1998) . Cooperative relationships with suppliers affect short-term performance by smoothing deliveries and reducing tactical coordination costs, while also influencing longer-term performance by helping firms develop new capabilities (Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000; Novak and Eppinger, 2001) . Research has measured supplier performance on dimensions such as quality, cost, responsiveness, improvements in product and process design, lead time, and inventory turns Poppo and Zenger, 1998; Krause et al., 2007) . The core conclusion is that multiple aspects of supplier performance strongly influence a buyer's short and long-term performance in its end-product markets (Elmaghraby, 2000) .
In order to understand firm performance, therefore, it is important to identify factors that influence different aspects of the performance of a firm's supplier relationships. We consider the direct effect of the buyer's own technical expertise and its supplier governance activities, as well as interactions among these factors, and develop predictions for each effect. We state our hypotheses in terms of the general concept of supplier performance, and then test the impact of technical expertise and governance mechanisms on five key dimensions, including quality, cost, delivery, communication, and cooperation.
Technical Expertise
Technical expertise is the extent to which a buyer understands the production processes and affiliated technologies underlying a good or service (Grant, 1996; Parmigiani and Mitchell, 2009 ). Technical expertise is a heterogeneous firm capability, developed over time, composed of interrelated routines (Barney, 1991; Szulanski 1996) . We assume the good requires a certain degree of knowledge to purchase it effectively and thus a non-trivial amount of specific investment. Firms can gain technical expertise directly through production of the component or indirectly through producing related products and conducting relevant R&D activities (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) . Firms tend to specialize in similar activities, as they can use common technical expertise across products (Richardson, 1972) . We focus on technical skills rather than on other functional expertise, such as marketing skills, because technical expertise is particularly important in facilitating supplier relationships -a buyer needs to understand the technical characteristics of the inputs to its products (Brusoni et al., 2001; Takeishi, 2002) . Firms with greater technical expertise will better predict how attributes of the product can affect manufacturing processes and, ultimately, the performance of the end product.
A buyer's technical expertise will contribute to supplier performance in four ways: buyers will be able to identify competent suppliers, monitor supplier activities more knowledgeably, provide greater assistance to suppliers, and attract better suppliers. First, firms that understand core elements of the development and production process will be better able to identify strong suppliers. Technically proficient buyers will be adept at screening and selecting suppliers because they can interpret their offerings, comparing them on technical attributes as well as price (Petersen et al., 2005) . Second, technically strong buyers will be better able to understand their suppliers' activities, so that they can monitor their performance more effectively to ensure that they meet the buyers' specifications (Wheelwright and Hayes, 1985; Krause et al., 1998) . Third, buyers with superior technical expertise will be better able to communicate technical details to suppliers. Their expertise provides them with a component evaluation capability by which they are better able to designate appropriate quality metrics and levels, making these both strict and achievable (Lincoln et al., 1998; Tiwana and Keil, 2007) . Thus, they can assist in improving supplier skills (Bradach, 1997; Krause et al., 1998; Dyer, 2000) . Fourth, technically strong buyers will be able to attract better suppliers (Richardson and Roumasset, 1995) . Suppliers can use relationships with strong buyers to learn about the latest developments and gain knowledge to trade with customers (Hayes et al., 1988; Powell et al., 1996) . Suppliers also often want to be part of an elite group of firms supporting a prominent, knowledgeable lead firm (Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000) . The fact that strong customers are likely to survive into the future also will attract suppliers and encourage them to cooperate, because they can expect a long relationship (Heide and Miner, 1992) . Thus, we propose: Hypothesis 1. The stronger a buyer's internal technical expertise relevant to a purchased good, the greater the performance the buyer will achieve in its supplier relationships for the good.
Governance Mechanisms: Relational Governance and Contracts
A firm's governance activities also may influence supplier performance. We first discuss the concept of relational governance mechanisms in the context of supplier management and then develop a parallel argument concerning contractual governance. We assume that purchased goods require active management of suppliers due to a non-trivial degree of knowledge and investment required to understand and procure these goods effectively.
We define relational governance mechanisms for supplier management as the processes a firm uses to manage its connections with suppliers, such as processes for maintaining goodwill, sharing information, and evaluating suppliers. For simplicity, we refer to these processes as relational governance mechanisms. This definition draws from ideas in the relational capability literature (e.g., Dyer and Singh, 1998) , applying them to the context of supply management.
Relational governance mechanisms accumulate over time, become reinforced through regular routines (c.f., Nelson and Winter, 1982) , and are analogous to alliance management mechanisms in that firms will be more successful if they dedicate resources to this activity (Kale et al., 2002) . While firms purchase a variety of goods, each with differing attributes, information requirements, and potential governance hazards, these relational governance mechanisms represent a firm-level approach or philosophy to holistically managing its supply base. Firms vary substantially in their use of relational governance mechanisms, even if they have common institutional or industrial contexts (Lincoln et al., 1998) . The classic example is in the automotive industry in which some firms (e.g. GM) have had an adversarial approach while others (e.g., Toyota) emphasize partnerships.
The concept of relational governance derives from Macneil's (1978; 1980) work on relational contracting, in which he contrasts one-off exchanges with ongoing exchanges that are based within and upon the relationship between the parties. Thus, maintaining goodwill, solidarity, integrity, and harmony are important. Information sharing is also vital, as this promotes mutuality within the relationship and reduces conflict. While perhaps less emphasized, evaluation is also a key component of relational governance, because it promotes fairness through measurement and sticking to the terms of the agreement. Quoting Macneil (1980:72) , "Many a problem occurs in performance, many an outfit skirts too close the edge of nonperformance and falls off, and a few evildoers in every crowd cheat or welsh." Evaluation will reduce the risk of nonperformance and strengthen the bonds between buyers and suppliers, establishing the parties' reputations and promoting future exchange. Womack and colleagues (1990) demonstrated the profound impact of cooperative supplier relationships in their studies of the automotive industry, which contrasted Japanese firms that compared developmental relationships with U.S. firms that took more adversarial approaches. Supply relationships can be a self-fulfilling prophecy, because firms that strive to create and maintain partnerships with suppliers will be likely to have more harmonious relationships than those that emphasize more adversarial roles (Hayes et al., 1988) . Firms that build upon past relationships and make commitments to future exchange will build trust and promote cooperation (Heide and John, 1990; Heide and Miner, 1992; Zaheer et al., 1998; Carson et al., 2006; Poppo, Zheng Zhou, and Ryu, 2008) . Activities that deepen the buyer-supplier relationship through richer communication and integration lead to stronger bonds of respect and trust, which then lead to improved performance (Chen et al., 2004; Lawson et al., 2008) . In a study of buyer-supplier dyads, Krause and colleagues (2007) found that while relationship length was not associated with improved performance, shared values and higher buyer commitment did lead to better outcomes. They also found that buyer involvement improved quality, flexibility, and delivery, but not cost, suggesting differential effects of relational governance.
In addition to maintaining goodwill, processes for information exchange and knowledge transfer are important to effective relational governance as they promote coordination, adaptation, and learning (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992) . Dyer and Singh (1998) investigated knowledge exchange between buyers and suppliers, noting that a firm that develops these relational capabilities can gain competitive advantage. Hult and colleagues (2007) suggest that promoting a culture of learning and protecting against knowledge appropriation facilitates exchange. Holcomb and Hitt (2007) concur with both of these insights and propose that skills in aligning firm and supplier goals, creating knowledge sharing routines, and developing cooperative experience will lead to more effective outsourcing. More generally, alliance studies suggest that boundary spanning activities help a firm overcome the constraints of local search (Mowery et al., 1996; Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003) .
Supplier evaluation and development are more formal means of relational governance.
Evaluation can include third party certification, audits, and written scorecards comparing suppliers (Dyer, 2000; Petersen et al., 2005) . These tools uncover problems before they become crises and use reputation to bolster suppliers' efforts. As Macauley (1963:63) states, "some industrial buyers go so far as to formalize this sanction (of preserving reputation) by issuing 'report cards' rating the performance of each supplier. The supplier rating goes to top management of the seller organization and these men can apply internal sanctions". Thus, relational governance can include both interpersonal and documented elements. Some aspects are quite formal and codified but, unlike contracts, these techniques are highly customized and third parties cannot provide enforcement or sanctions. Supplier development efforts, including technical consultation, creating supplier associations, and frequent engineering visits also improve the richness and relevance of knowledge shared. These activities are the culmination of the aforementioned relational skills of maintaining goodwill, exchanging information, and evaluating suppliers (Krause et al., 1998; Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000) . This logic leads to H2: Hypothesis 2. The more extensively a buyer employs relational governance mechanisms, the greater the performance the buyer will achieve in its supplier relationships.
Firms often support supplier relationships through contractual agreements, whether to complement or substitute for relational governance mechanisms. Contracts are written agreements that designate the ex-ante features of the exchange, involve considerable detail, and may span several years (Macneil, 1978) . Contracts differ from standard purchase orders, which cover a simple, one-time transfer of goods with no provision for change. Contract documents not only dictate product specifications, annual quantities, prices with clauses for price changes, and penalties for non-performance, but are also rife with legal conditions. The agreements are typically negotiated by senior managers from various functional areas, involve strategically significant goods, and provide blanket agreements that create a template for ongoing exchange, often including change processes (Argyres and Mayer, 2007) . Contracts also assist in subsequent monitoring of exchanges (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972) . Firms can consider supplier incentives and occasions for opportunism, building safeguards into the agreement (Williamson, 1985) . As they are legal documents, each party has the option of invoking the courts and thus involving a third party in the event of a breach in performance. By agreeing to a contract, both the firm and the supplier agree to deal fairly with each other (Helper and Levine, 1992) .
Contracts can improve supplier performance by improving communication, providing investment incentives, highlighting the importance of a relationship, and threatening sanctions.
The process of creating an agreement helps develop communication between a firm and its supplier, clarifies expectations, generates a common understanding of goals, and facilitates coordination of buyer-supplier activities (Arrow, 1974; Reuer and Ariño, 2007; Mayer and Teece, 2008) . A contract helps assure a supplier will profit from investments made to support a series of exchanges, thereby creating incentives to maintain performance levels and protect these investments (Williamson, 1985) . In parallel, Kulwani and Narayandas (1995) argue that suppliers may be more likely to focus on contracted customer relationships, because the contract signifies that the purchase is important to both the buyer and supplier. In addition, suppliers will want to avoid sanctions outlined in the contract as well as court costs and reputational damage from legal proceedings and therefore will attend more closely to performance targets, fixing problems before they become serious (Macneil, 1978; 1980) . Thus, we predict:
Hypothesis 3. Buyers that use contractual agreements to govern supply relationships will achieve greater performance in their supplier relationships than buyers that do not use contracts.
The question of endogeneity arises here. It is possible that observed governance mechanisms will have no impact on supplier performance if buyers selectively chose to use relational governance and/or contracts in cases that best suit them, such as for specialized components, while using more arms length approaches in other cases, such as commodity components. Our empirical analysis will control for some aspects of such endogeneity.
Nonetheless, both relational governance and contract negotiation are learned skills, so that firms that develop more extensive governance activities may benefit across their portfolio of sourcing relationships, even in the presence of potential endogeneity. Moreover, endogeneity will be less of an issue for the interaction effects that we discuss below.
The first three hypotheses test what are sometimes posed as competing views on relationship management, but may well have complementary influences on supplier performance. The empirical analysis will assess the degree of complementarity or substitution. In addition to direct effects, there may be positive interactions among the different aspects of relationship management, potentially reinforcing each other, which we discuss below.
Joint Effects of Technical Expertise and Governance Mechanisms
We will consider three possible joint effects among technical expertise, relational governance, and contractual agreements. First, greater technical expertise may enhance the benefits of relational governance. One component of relational governance involves performance monitoring and evaluation. A buyer's technical expertise will assist in developing accurate and detailed specifications to provide the basis for later evaluation. Rather than relying on a standard scorecard, buyers with more knowledge can create better tools for assessing quality, resulting in improved performance. Smarter buyers will also be better able to detect quality slippage and assist their suppliers in modifying their processes. Suppliers also will want to perform well to live up to buyer expectations and not breach their trust in the relationship. In addition to more astute supplier evaluation, greater technical skills will lead to more extensive but focused development activities. Expertise thus improves evaluation and development, both important aspects of managing supply relationships and improving performance (Krause et al., 1998; Petersen et al., 2005) .
Sharing information is also a critical component of relational governance. More knowledgeable buyers, who can discuss complex technical details, should benefit from deeper information exchange with suppliers. The combination of technical expertise and relational governance mechanisms may help the firm develop communication, promoting greater learning and cooperation (Richardson, 1972; Tunisi and Zanfei, 1998; Zollo et al., 2002) . Such exchanges will be valuable in managing changes in production due to variation in volumes and shipment timing. Buyers with a greater technical understanding will also be better able to predict the next generation of products and work with suppliers to develop these, thus extending their relationships. To learn from suppliers, firms need both a basic understanding of the technology (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) and partners who are willing and able to exchange ideas.
Several studies suggest that firms with both strong technical expertise and the ability to create close external relationships enjoy competitive advantages, because they can better identify and act upon opportunities. Brusoni and colleagues (2001) found that aircraft and chemical firms that act as systems integrators cannot fully outsource all technical understanding but rather need to maintain a cognitive overlap with suppliers to manage inter-dependencies among purchased components. MacDuffie and Helper (1997) showed that automotive firms that wish to create a competitive advantage through their suppliers need both a technical understanding and motivated suppliers. Bradach (1997) suggested that restaurant franchisors that operate their own outlets and thus gain a technical understanding of the business benefit from sharing ideas with their franchisees. Holweg and Pil (2008) Second, a firm's technical expertise should heighten the effectiveness of contractual agreements. Firms that have a better technical understanding of a component can create more complete and meaningful specifications for suppliers to follow. Rather than following a standard boilerplate agreement, knowledgeable buyers can customize a contract to better meet both their needs and those of their supplier (Argyres and Mayer, 2007) . They should be able to negotiate better terms, particularly regarding specific quality requirements, because they have some understanding of their supplier's production process. While, by their nature, contracts are always incomplete, skilled buyers can better anticipate technical changes and incorporate contingencies into the contract.
Once the contract has been negotiated, technical expertise will help the firm monitor and evaluate suppliers to enforce contract terms. Suppliers will recognize the firm's expertise and be less likely to engage in opportunistic behavior, such as substituting inferior materials, because the firm will be able to recognize infractions. A firm's technical reputation based upon frequent trade can also reinforce contracting. (Lyons, 1996) . Firms with more technical expertise tend to craft better contracts and are able to reduce disruption and other hazards (Mayer and Salomon, 2006; Delios and Henisz, 2000) . This logic supports the following:
Hypothesis 4b. Stronger technical expertise relevant to a purchased good and the use of contractual agreements will mutually enhance supplier performance.
Third, joint use of relational governance mechanisms and contractual agreements also may contribute to superior supplier performance. Several scholars have suggested a complementarity between these aspects of the supply relationship, particularly since contracts will always be incomplete. Macauley (1963) argues that contracts are important but operate better in the background rather than the foreground of the supply relationship so that the give and take of business can be uninterrupted by lawyers. He suggests that contracts are valuable communication devices and organizing tools which serve to stabilize the relationship, but that business professionals "welcome a measure of vagueness" in contracts so they can "handle disputes in their own way". Cannon and colleagues (2000) echo this point, and found that cooperative norms complemented legal contracts under conditions of uncertainty and specific investment. Carson and co-authors (2006) suggest that the type of uncertainty matters; ambiguity is better addressed through contracts, while volatility is more effectively managed through relationships.
Because contracts reflect the underlying social context (Macauley, 1963; Macneil, 1980; Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 2002) , firms with more extensive relational governance skills may create more customized contracts. Cousins and Menguc (2006) found that greater socialization through regular on-site visits and workshops as well as greater integration such as linked production schedules led to improved contractual conformance, suggesting that these relational activities promote a better understanding of buyer expectations. Poppo and Zenger (2002) demonstrated that increases in relational governance tended to be coupled with more complex contracts, suggesting that a close relationship eases the process of creating the contract by narrowing the domains for opportunism and allowing the document to be more customized and specific. Zheng Zhou and colleagues (2008) found that even in China, where relational ties are vitally important, firms use customized contracts to mitigate opportunism due to uncertainty. Klein and Leffler (1981) posit that contracts include some self-enforcing range such that the agreements are based on a combination of private and joint enforcement. Ryall and Sampson (2007) found that relationship history affected the type and degree of contract detail, suggesting that contracts can serve as a roadmap for enforcement of relational sanctions. In this way, supplier report cards and other relational governance tools could be explicitly or implicitly incorporated into contracts, with the potential to invoke contractual and relational sanctions.
Richer relationships may also lead to more effective contract execution with more cooperation and less conflict. Contracts indicate firms' intent to maintain a relationship and support cooperation as they expect the relationship to last (Macneil, 1978; Heide and Miner, 1992; Helper and Levine, 1992) . Sako (1992) identified contracts as providing a form of trust that complements two other forms of trust (competence and goodwill), suggesting that contracts help stabilize relationships. Inter-organizational trust, presumably developed through relational mechanisms, reduces the costs of contract negotiation and subsequent conflict (Zaheer et al., 1998) . Contracts can also act as coordination devices, which may be more effective when combined with trust in the relationship as this reduces risk and facilitates learning (Mellewigt et al., 2005; Reuer and Ariño, 2007) . In a sharp example of what can happen to a firm that lacks both relational and contractual governance, Harrison (2004) These arguments suggest that relational governance and contractual governance act as complements. Stronger relationships may enable crafting of more effective contracts and help deal with uncertainty. Contracts may act as broad strategic frameworks, while relationships fill in the tactical and specific details on how business actually gets done. This discussion leads to our final hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4c. More extensive use of relational governance mechanisms and the use of contractual agreements will mutually enhance supplier performance.
Counter to hypothesis 4c, scholars such as Ghoshal and Moran (1996) have argued that contracts may inhibit relational governance activities, especially in contexts where standardized contracts are commonplace. However, such constraints would only arise if firms systematically allowed contracts to impose limits on their relational activities, rather than creating a common language from which relationship management could proceed. Hypothesis 4c assumes that firms at least attempt to avoid such irrationalities; our empirical analysis will help assess the views.
In sum, we predict that a firm's technical expertise and its governance activities will influence supplier performance, both individually and jointly. By testing these hypotheses, we can uncover potential tradeoffs for firms in managing their supply relationships. For example, if technical expertise does not influence supplier performance, firms may be wasting efforts on developing internal knowledge and would be better off developing their contractual and relational governance skills. If so, then the core capabilities of the outsourcing firm could well be governance skills rather than technical expertise, such that a seeming "hollowing out" of the firm would not be detrimental. Likewise, if relational governance does not affect supplier performance, firms could spend their efforts in other areas and perhaps benefit from more competitive supply relationships. Moreover, if contractual governance is ineffective, firms might instead rely on other means of managing their relationships. If we find that technical expertise, relational governance, and governance mechanisms are substitutes, then firms could select which of these to emphasize, potentially conserving resources since the strength in one area could compensate for a lack of skills in the others. Conversely, if these skills are complements, then firms would benefit by maintaining a base level of each skill.
DATA AND METHODS
We studied sourcing decisions of North American metal stamping and powder metal firms for production tooling and service components. These two sectors of the metal forming industry consist of many independent small companies, most of which are private firms. This choice enables us to focus on relatively straightforward buyer-supplier relationships, ruling out alliances, joint ventures, and other complex relationships that these firms rarely undertake.
While the firms do not gain press attention when they outsource, they still need to carefully consider how their expertise and governance skills will enable them to implement this strategy.
Given the small size of these firms, their choice to outsource a particular activity (die making) may have the same relative impact on operations and employment as a Fortune 500 firm outsourcing an entire function (manufacturing). The firms and their suppliers are similar in size, controlling for explanations based on size and power differentials. Both sectors share relatively homogenous production processes and common end product markets. Supplier costs, delivery, communication, cooperation, and quality levels are vitally important to these firms and their OEM customers, many of whom are in the automotive industry (Womack et al., 1990 ).
We first undertook exploratory interviews with managers of eleven metal forming firms.
The interviews helped us understand their production processes and identified five goods that firms commonly source: die designs, construction of progressive stamping dies (or, in the powder metal industry, powder compaction dies), die maintenance, end-part machining services, and end-part surface coating services. These inputs were common to all firms, strategically significant, and often outsourced. Note that our data was at the input level, not at the transaction level, as the latter is a theoretical archetype and infeasible to collect. Even these small firms have hundreds of individual order transactions annually. More importantly, managers do not make decisions at the transaction level. Rather, they consider characteristics of the input such as annual volume or technical features and use these to determine whether to outsource and from which suppliers. Individual transactions, or purchase orders, merely represent how they implement these decisions (van Weele, 1994) .
In order to produce their end product, these firms must source the designs, construction, and maintenance of the dies they use. Die design is a complex process in which designers must select the proper type of steel, consider press features, and optimize die layout to maximize productivity. Dies involve numerous interrelated components, including top and bottom shoes, punches, bearings, springs, and guide pins. They are typically produced from tool-grade steel using computer numerical controlled (CNC) mills and electric-discharge machining (EDM) centers. A considerable degree of expertise is required for die design and construction, as suggested in a machining handbook: "…die design and die making are complex arts as well as technologies that require considerable skill, knowledge, and practical experience" (Walsh, 1994: 792) . Die maintenance is somewhat less sophisticated, typically involving the regrinding and replacement of punches after a set number of press strokes or after a press problem. Firms generally source one design or die at a time, comparing bids from several suppliers. Contracts are relatively unusual; rather, relationships develop between buyers and suppliers, since with experience the supplier can understand the idiosyncrasies of the buyer's presses and products.
End part machining and surface coating are downstream operations necessary to meet customer specifications. End part machining involves adding features such as slots or holes that cannot be stamped or molded into the part. Surface coating includes plating, electro-coating, or similar processes that are typically used for corrosion resistance. Firms usually obtain bids from numerous suppliers but prefer to source locally, due to relatively high volumes and the need for rapid turnaround. End-part machining and surface coating are often governed by contracts specifying the approximate annual volume required, price, and extensive specifications detailed in drawings and other related documents. Many of the end products of these buyers are, in turn, sold to OEM manufacturers (e.g., automobile producers), so contract specifications or informal requirements include the OEM's quality and technical demands. Because these demands are often difficult to predict, relational governance mechanisms such as frequent supplier contact are common.
The following example from our empirical setting illustrates how firms in the industry use combinations of contracts, relational governance, and technical expertise to manage their supplier relationships. Windfall Products (now a division of Metaldyne, Inc.) is a powder metal parts firm that manufactures gears, rod guides, exhaust gas recirculation components, and similar products for auto sector companies such as the Delphi Corporation. Windfall has strong technical expertise in its product lines. Windfall used several mechanisms to manage its relationship with Monroe Plating, a zinc plating supplier. First, a multi-year contract stipulated major terms of the relationship, such as product specifications, annual volumes, and prices. In addition, Windfall personnel visited Monroe's facility on a monthly basis to conduct quality audits and to maintain positive relations. Three people from Windfall frequently participated in the visits: a purchasing manager discussed price and product flows; a supplier development coordinator worked on quality issues and evaluated Monroe's performance; and a metallurgist helped Monroe solve technical problems concerning the plating and confirm that their processes met Windfall's and the OEM's specifications. Thus, Windfall used contracts and relational governance in managing its relationship with Monroe, but also leveraged its own technical expertise.
Based upon our understanding of the firms and the five goods, we designed a survey booklet with six sections, one for data on each good and one for overall firm information. This design resulted in rich, fine grained, multi-level data appropriate for investigating sourcing decisions and relationships. It also removed recency, size, and familiarity biases because we did not ask respondents to nominate a supplier but rather inquired about sourcing of classes of goods used by the firms. For firms that used multiple suppliers, we asked respondents to create a summary rating based on their allocation of business to each. We chose scales based on reviews of the literature, refined by discussions during the preliminary interviews. Appendix 1 reports the items and their sources; most items used seven-point scales (Fowler, 1995) . The full survey contained about 300 items in 24 pages, covering several aspects of the sourcing decision in addition to contractual and relational governance mechanisms and supplier performance. To ensure face validity, we pretested the survey by soliciting feedback from academic colleagues, managers, and industry association executives. We also performed a pilot test with managers that replicated final survey conditions. We considered surveying suppliers, but a bilateral or dyadic survey was infeasible due to the fragmented nature of the industry, the difficulty in locating suppliers (e.g., a die-making firm can be as small as three people, operating out of a garage), and the lack of a supplier industry association or other entity that could provide a sampling frame. Hence, we followed common practice in buyer/supplier studies and used the buyer's perspective to assess relationships.
Fortunately, industry associations exist for metal stamping firms (the Precision Metalforming Association) and powder metal firms (the Metal Powder Industry Federation).
From these groups, we obtained membership lists that we used as the basis for our sample. We called each of the 509 member firms to identify the correct contact person, typically the general manager, to whom to send the survey. In 2002, we sent the survey to the 453 firms that provided us with contact information. Following Dillman's (1978; 2000) tailored design method, we initiated between two and six contacts by various modes with each firm, resulting in 193 usable surveys and a 43% usable response rate. This is significantly higher than the 20% rate that is common for firm-level surveys (Paxson et al., 1995) .
We adopted a key informant single-respondent approach for the survey. While in some cases it is preferable to have multiple survey respondents, we believe that due to the small size of these firms and the technical and specialized nature of the survey, it was appropriate to request information from one highly knowledgeable respondent (Phillips, 1981; Li and Atuahene-Gima, 2002 ). In our case, the respondent was typically the president or general manager. Senior managers in metal forming firms typically have considerable experience in purchasing production items, particularly because this is a mature industry and technology, with wellestablished buying and supplying firms. One of the authors worked for several years as a purchasing manager in this industry and can attest that one senior executive typically has oversight of sourcing decisions and managing suppliers. Our first-hand knowledge of this context and the fact we asked about overall sourcing experience over the past year for several goods also gave us confidence in this approach. Thus, we believe the use of a single, wellqualified respondent did not bias our sample and was appropriate in this context. Nevertheless, we took several precautions against common method bias, because we were obtaining our dependent and independent variables from the same source (Lindell and Whitney, 2001; Podsakoff et al., 2003) . Our procedural remedies included separating the items relating to these variables by several pages, using different scale anchors, and reverse scaling some items. To reduce item ambiguity, we kept questions simple, avoided double-barreled items, and cognitively pretested the instrument prior to launch (Campanelli, 1997) . Social desirability was minimized by protecting respondent anonymity and by obtaining information about a class of goods, rather than a particular supplier. Once we obtained the data, we also conducted the Harman one-factor test (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986) , which indicated that common methods variance was not an issue.
The responding firms had similar demographic features. Respondents tended to be small (95% employed fewer than 500 people, with a mean of about 75 employees), non-union (86%), and fairly old (mean of 44 years in age). We analyzed the data for non-response bias (Armstrong and Overton, 1977) , comparing respondents to non-respondents by firm type and size and found no significant differences. Based on these tests and the starting point that our sample drew on industry association listings that represent the firm populations, we believe non-response and sample selection bias are unlikely. We also used several control variables in the subsequent analysis, which will further reduce potential bias (Tomaskovic-Devey et al., 1994) . After culling cases with no external supplier, the data represent 508 purchases for 182 firms for five goods.
Variables
The following section describes how we measured our dependent variable, supplier performance, and our key independent variables: technical expertise, relational governance mechanisms, and contractual agreements. Relational governance is a firm-level variable, based on the practices and philosophies of supply management that apply to a firm's entire supply base, while performance and our other key explanatory variables are good-specific. We also describe good and firm-level control variables.
Supplier performance. We devised five performance variables that executives in our preliminary interviews identified as important: supplier cooperativeness, quality, price, delivery, and communication (see Appendix 1). These dimensions align with those frequently used in the buyer/supplier literature (Krause et al., 2007) . We chose to look at each dimension separately, rather than group performance into one or two factors so we could understand the impact of our explanatory variables on each specific type of performance; there is no a priori reason to believe that different types of performance tend to move together. We used seven-point Likert scales for the measures, ranging from "absolutely terrible" to "absolutely terrific"; Fowler (1995) notes that these anchor terms are more descriptive than the standard agree/disagree terms and should result in better measurement because they are more indicative of a buyer's perception of supplier performance.
We asked about multiple performance dimensions for each of five different goods, while limiting ourselves to a single item for each performance dimension for each type of component so that we would not overly burden the respondents. Respondents reported no ambiguity in understanding the performance dimensions during pretests of the instrument, so that single-item measures were appropriate. For the focal goods, respondents reported that they typically dealt with four or fewer suppliers, with a mean of two. This small number reduces the possibility of ecological fallacy (aggregation bias), allowing us to appropriately use aggregate performance data and the predictions based on this data, rather than requiring data on individual suppliers (Robinson, 1950) . The number of suppliers was similar over the five good categories, although firms tended to use slightly fewer suppliers for die maintenance and slightly more for surface coating.
Technical expertise. The variable for a firm's technical expertise reflected the extent to which the firm possesses capabilities for producing the focal good. These attributes result from a deep understanding of the technology related to the good and from experience in production.
This variable used four items, some of which we adapted from prior work (Walker and Weber, 1984) . All items used seven-point scales. To create the scale, we used a weighted average of the four items with the weights based upon a confirmatory factor analysis. We then meandifferenced the value in the interaction models (Aiken and West, 1991). The reliability coefficient for the technical expertise measure was 0.86, based on the Cronbach's alpha, well above recommended benchmarks (Nunnally, 1967) .
Relational governance mechanisms. This firm-level variable includes 13 items that
measure goodwill, information sharing, and evaluation techniques. We included items that measured both historical and projected commitment to the relationship. We included documentary aspects of relational governance, such as quality certification, plus interpersonal mechanisms such as communication channels. We chose items based on prior work Dyer, 1997) and on factors that emerged in preliminary interviews. Some items involve written agreements and formal evaluation, consistent with our definition of relational governance. Moreover, none correlate over r=0.18 with our contract variable (see Table 2 ), suggesting independence and the potential to confidently interpret the direct and indirect effects of relational and contractual governance. We used a weighted average of the items to create the variable and used mean-differences in the interaction models. Reliability was 0.71, based on Cronbach's alpha. This is reasonable, considering that this figure underestimates other measures of reliability since alpha assumes equal loadings for all items (Nunnally, 1967; Bollen, 1989) .
These items measure the extent to which a firm used a particular relational governance mechanism, rather than how well the firm used the mechanism, because it is not clear how one would create an objective measure of the quality of the mechanisms. Therefore, our approach assumes that more extensive usage of relational governance mechanisms associates with higher quality relational management. Clearly, usage frequency and quality may vary, but intensity will correlate with quality so long as a firm has been able to learn from its experience. In addition, measuring extent rather than quality of relational governance helps avoid the risk of attribution bias, in which firms that are satisfied with supplier performance believe they have effective relational governance.
Contractual agreements.
We created a contracts variable relative to each good with an item that asked whether the buyer used a long-term written agreement for the purchased component (Appendix 1). If the buyer chose either of the options involving a long-term contract, we concluded that the firm used contracts rather than purchase orders; as we noted earlier, contracts are distinct from purchase orders for individual transactions. We created a 0-1 binary variable to indicate contract use, which was affirmative for 71 cases (after dropping 16 cases that indicated the use of combinations of options). Our operationalization is similar to that of Carson and colleagues (2006) , who also created a binary variable for contracts based on responses to a survey item with five options. We found similar usage of contracts among the different goods, from 13% to 23%, with a mean of 19%; thus a substantial majority of firms did not use contracts.
While we did not obtain details on contract length or clauses, it is likely that these contracts are similar between firms as we focused on a few specific goods in a well defined industry sector.
Control variables.
We included several control variables in both stages of the analysis.
We controlled for asset specificity for each good through a variable composed of three items measuring the availability of alternate suppliers; this could affect performance because buyers with few options may have little recourse if supplier performance deteriorates (Williamson, 1985) . We also controlled for volume, technological, and performance uncertainty as these may affect the choice of sourcing mode and performance. We controlled for firm and supplier scope economies, as well as for supplier expertise and scale economies. For all of these input-level controls, we used multi-item scales, many from prior work (e.g., Anderson and Weitz, 1986; Bensaou and Anderson, 1999) . Other controls included firm age (years, logged), volume of the good required (annual units, based on a five point scale), whether the focal firm was unionized, whether it produced powder metal parts, and dummy variables for component type.
Some controls only applied to either the first or second stage of analysis. Our instrumental variables, used only in the first stage, were the similarity of goods sourced, firm economies of scope, and supplier economies of scope, which have little correlation with the performance measures. In the second stage, we controlled for concurrent sourcing, meaning that the firm produced the good internally and purchased it from outside suppliers. This sourcing mode provides a credible threat of vertical integration as well as more intimate knowledge of the procured goods (Harrigan, 1986 , Parmigiani, 2007 . Because we do not have dyadic data, we could not control for relationship duration or prior exchanges between a particular buyer and supplier. Given the maturity of this industry and the players, most of the relationships are stable and fairly long-lived. We also could not control for the size of the buyer's legal staff, but these small firms typically do not employ internal legal counsel. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics and Table 2 provides correlations between the items and the main constructs. The presence of only moderate correlation among five performance measures suggests that they arise from different processes. The relatively strong correlations between the constructs and their related items and the relatively weak correlations between the items and the alternate constructs suggest matching between the measures and constructs. ********** Table 1 and Table 2 about here ********** Methods
We used a two-stage technique in which we first modeled sourcing mode choice, all internal production (make) or purchase some or all of their requirements (buy or concurrently source). We used output from this stage as an input to the second stage analyses, in which we estimated influences on each of the five types of performance. The two-stage approach has become increasingly common for similarly structured data to control for endogeneity (Leiblein et al., 2002; Mayer and Nickerson, 2005; Morrow et al., 2007) . In this approach, one uses a common set of independent and control variables in both stages, but uses one or more unique variables in the first stage. Ideally, these unique variables, called instrumental variables, are not highly correlated with the ultimate dependent variable (performance) and have been shown by prior work to affect the first stage dependent variable (sourcing mode choice).
We relied both on our theoretical arguments as well as prior work to determine our common independent variables and first stage instruments. We included variables for expertise, relational governance, and contracting in both stages, as these were our key theoretical constructs. We also included control variables for asset specificity, supplier expertise, volume uncertainty, technological uncertainty, and performance uncertainty in both stages as prior work suggest that these may affect mode choice (Williamson, 1985) and subsequent performance (Poppo and Zenger, 2002) . Other control variables included in both stages addressed firm characteristics (age, size, unionization, and sector) and product attributes (scale economies, volume requirements, and dummy variables for each type of input) which have the potential to affect both mode choice and supplier performance.
We selected three variables as instruments for the first stage to predict mode choice: input similarity, firm economies of scope, and supplier economies of scope. Firms may be more likely to internally produce homogenous products or those related to other goods they produce to enjoy improved coordination or knowledge spillovers (Richardson, 1972) , but the effects of these on supplier performance are ambiguous. In particular, these may have varying effects by type of performance, perhaps improving communication but harming quality or delivery. Prior work using this same dataset indicated that these three variables did significantly affect the sourcing decision (Parmigiani, 2007) . In turn, as indicated in Table 1 , the correlations between these variables and supplier performance are small, suggesting that they would be appropriate instruments. The prior connection with mode choice and low correlations with performance suggest that these three variables are suitable instruments.
Our approach involved a probit model in the first stage with OLS regression models for the second stage. In both stages, we used robust standard errors adjusted for repeat observations by firm to account for within-firm non-independence (Mizruchi and Stearns, 2001) . A probit model is required in the first stage to create the inverse Mills ratio for the second stage (Kennedy, 2008) . This ratio and a dummy variable for concurrent sourcing were added to the second stage, while the three first stage instruments were omitted. After culling cases that did not include the contractual agreement variable, our data resulted in 373 purchases from 164 unique firms.
Because it is likely that the within-firm observations will not be independent, which is common in survey research, we used a clustering adjustment that increases the standard errors but does not affect the coefficient estimates. This approach is more appropriate than a firm fixedeffects model because we have a small number of observations per firm relative to the number of firms (only one observation per firm in 37 cases). Had we used a fixed effects model, the structure of our data would have resulted in problems of insufficient variance, perfect prediction, and the inability to estimate the firm coefficients, thereby potentially biasing the coefficients of the primary explanatory variables (Greene, 1997; Kennedy, 2008) . By using the clustering approach, along with a control variable for firm age, we can more clearly identify the effect of our key firm-level variable of interest, relational governance.
The structure of our data precluded us from using standardized, one-step algorithms found in statistical software. For example, we considered using Stata's "Heckman" command in which one can run one model to generate first and second stage output for both dependent variables using common independent variables, controls, and first stage instruments. However, this approach did not suit the study as it does not cleanly handle firm-specific effects (i.e., clustered standard errors) in both stages. Although a one step approach is methodologically superior as it is more efficient, we felt that controlling for the between case correlations caused by the firm-specific effects were more important to address since we had up to five cases of sourcing per firm. It may be that some unmeasured, firm-specific attributes affect which firms outsource and we wanted to capture and control for these in estimating supplier performance. Therefore, our approach of first predicting whether firms would use outside suppliers and then incorporating this selection variable into each of the different performance equations is cleaner econometrically and more appropriate conceptually.
Likewise, our data and conceptual approach prevented us from using structural equation modeling, a popular technique for analyzing survey data. This type of analysis is difficult to implement for data that incorporates multiple levels (e.g., the firm and the good) and interaction terms. It also is best suited for dependent variables measured by multiple item scales, rather than by single items. Moreover, our sample size was also relatively small for this technique, as five cases per parameter estimate are recommended (Bentler and Chou, 1987) .
We chose OLS regression rather than ordered logit or probit for the second stage for conceptual and empirical reasons. Conceptually, although we created seven categories (e.g., 1=terrible to 7=terrific) for our respondents, it is possible that some respondents may have been more strict than others such that a "2" from some may have been akin to a "4" from others.
Given this possibility, we can assume a continuous relationship along the performance dimension but cannot have complete confidence in the categories. Empirically, we did not have an even distribution among all seven reply options, which may bias the estimation algorithm as it relies on "cuts" for each category. Perhaps not surprisingly, less than 10% of observations were in the lowest three categories, most likely because buyers would switch suppliers who performed poorly. Given this distribution, we did not believe that ah an ordered estimation method was appropriate. Thus, our approach of a first stage probit for sourcing mode choice and a second stage OLS model for performance best suited our data and best fit our conceptual framework.
Nonetheless, we used the alternative techniques in sensitivity analyses that we report in the results section.
RESULTS
We first conducted a probit analysis to determine which firms would produce internally versus use outside suppliers. This stage controlled for potential endogeneity of supplier performance based upon attributes that made the firm more likely to outsource, such as superior governance skills. In addition, including the governance mechanism variables (relational governance and contracts) helps control for endogeneity in the use of these mechanisms by assessing whether firms choice to outsource associates with their governance choices. This analysis, which Appendix 2 reports, indicated that greater technical expertise promoted internal production, while relational governance and contracting did not affect mode choice. Among the other variables, internal production increased with performance uncertainty, firm age, and firm scope economies, while decreasing with technological uncertainty, scale economies, and supplier scope economies. We created an Inverse Mills Ratio variable based on predictions from this first model and used this term in the second-stage performance models (Shaver, 1998; Leiblein et al., 2002; Hamilton and Nickerson, 2003; Morrow et al., 2007) .
The models in Table 3 tested hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 by assessing how the firm's technical expertise and use of governance mechanisms influenced the five supplier performance outcomes.
The results are consistent with hypothesis 1 on all five performance dimensions and hypothesis 2 on three dimensions. Consistent with hypothesis 1, technical expertise had a positive and strongly significant impact on cooperation, quality, price, delivery, and communication (all at p<0.01). Consistent with hypothesis 2, use of relational governance mechanisms had at least a moderately significant positive effect on cooperation (p<0.05), delivery (p<0.10), and communication (p<0.05). Relational governance had no significant impact on quality or price. ********** Table 3 about here ********** Contrary to hypothesis 3, use of contracts had no significant effect on any of the performance variables. The lack of significance for contracting may arise because firms in this industry tend to use a small number of suppliers and rarely use contracts, possibly because industry maturity may promote reputational bonds over written agreements. In addition, as we noted earlier, if firms are able to make appropriate choices of when and when not to use contracts, depending on the nature of a given set of transactions with a particular supplier, then there will be little or no impact on performance. Table 4 then presents models that test the joint effects of expertise and governance, finding targeted support for Hypotheses 4a and 4c. The results in Table 4 for the main effects of technical expertise, relational governance, and contracting are similar to those in Table 3 . Table   4 continues to support H1 for all five performance dimensions (p <0.01). The results also continue to support H2 for cooperation and communication, although at reduced significance (p<0.10), while the positive impact on delivery performance lost its moderate significance. The reduction in significance for the relational governance effects occurs because the interactions with technical expertise and contracting pick up part of the effect, which we discuss next. ********** Table 4 about here ********** Table 4 reports focused support for two of hypotheses concerning joint effects (H4a and H4c)
1 . Greater combinations of technical expertise and relational governance (H4a) contribute to cooperation performance (p<0.05), but have no significant impact on the other four performance dimensions. Combinations of technical expertise and contracting (H4b) had no significant impact on performance. Combinations of relational governance and contracting (H4c) had at least moderately significant impact on price (p<0.05) and delivery (p<0.10). Intriguingly, the main effect of contracts on price performance became significantly negative (p<0.05), now that the price model added the interaction of relational governance and contracting.
The positive joint impact of contracts and relational governance on price satisfaction in model 3 of Table 4 is intriguing, especially when coupled with the negative impact of contracts and the lack of impact of relational governance alone. The presence of the joint effect of relational governance and contracts suggests that firms were most satisfied with contracted pricing performance when they were also practiced at identifying desirable suppliers and managing the flow of information between the two firms. This result may also reflect a zero-sum game nature of price negotiation, with trust and goodwill ameliorating potential negative outcomes and improving the perception of fairness. Thus, neither contractual nor relational governance alone is sufficient to achieve satisfactory prices -the firm benefits by having both.
Indeed, firms that rely on contracts while lacking relational governance ability may suffer weaker pricing satisfaction.
Several control variables influence performance. Unionized buyers tended to be less satisfied about performance, although the effect was significant only for quality, possibly because union contracts limit flexibility in production. Concurrent sourcing reduced cooperation and price performance, perhaps because the combination of internal production and external sourcing made coordination more difficult, made suppliers more suspicious of buyers, and/or gave buyers more accurate cost data. Delivery performance tended to be superior for end product coating activities, possibly because firms can monitor delivery performance closely in this final stage operation and replace underperforming suppliers quickly. The inverse Mills Ratio (the output of the first stage model) is significant for quality and delivery performance, suggesting that some the factors that influence the choice to outsource also affect performance.
Sensitivity analyses examined several other influences. We combined the five individual performance items into an aggregate measure and found support for H1, but not for the other predictions. This is to be expected because aggregating hides nuanced relationships, highlighting the importance of measuring dependent variables at the correct level of specificity (Ray et al., 2004 ). Second, we found similar results when we added the number of suppliers to our models.
This variable was never significant and did not affect the reported hypothesis tests. Third, we considered the possibility that the level of the respondent might affect their perception of supplier performance; because we had the titles of all respondents, we could determine which were higher-level executives (e.g., President, Vice President, other officers and directors) and included a binary variable for this characteristic. The respondent level variable was not significant and our results were equivalent when we included the variable. Finally, we omitted the "formal contract" item from the relational governance measure and reran the models, in case this item conflicted with our measure of contracting, finding similar results. We chose to keep this item in the scale because reliability was better and the item is consistent with the conceptual definition of relational governance.
We assessed several alternative specifications for data, and estimation method. We estimated models that omitted the contracting variable (n=508; the contracting variable had a substantial number of missing cases), finding similar results. We ran structural equation models for hypotheses 1, 2, and 3, again with similar results. We also tried using the "Heckman" command, which runs the two stages simultaneously. We obtained the same results for H1 for four of the five dependent variables and the same results for H3 but many of the runs had convergence problems, likely due to a small number of observations for certain sourcing modes for some types of goods (e.g., few cases of firms internally conducting surface coating). We also estimated single stage regression, ordered logit, and ordered probit models, finding similar results for all hypotheses.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
We started by asking whether inter-firm governance mechanisms, including both contractual and relational mechanisms, can substitute for a firm's internal technical skills in maintaining supplier performance or whether a firm risks hollowing itself out by de-emphasizing internal expertise when it outsources. We considered how technical expertise, relational governance, and contractual governance affected five elements of supplier performance (cooperation, quality, price, delivery, and communication) independently and jointly, while controlling for potential endogeneity of the choice to outsource. This work is the most systematic study to date of how systems of exchange skills involving technical expertise and the two types of governance mechanisms affect supplier performance.
Our results suggest that relational governance often contributes to supplier performance but, nonetheless, that hollowing out will result in poor supplier performance. A buyer's technical expertise significantly improves all five dimensions of supplier performance. In addition, relational governance has a significant impact on a more focused set of performance dimensions, including both cooperation and communication. At the same time, we found no evidence that contractual agreements directly affected performance, possibly because our firms are relatively small and typically can choose when contracts make sense and when they do not.
The interactions of technical expertise and the two governance mechanisms have more focused impact. Stronger combinations of technical expertise and relational governance improve supplier cooperation. Greater combinations of relational governance and contracting, meanwhile, improve price performance and also provide moderately significant benefits for delivery performance. Notably, as we discussed above, relying on contracts without applying complementary relational skills has a negative impact on satisfaction with prices.
Thus, in several nuanced ways, technical expertise and supplier governance mechanisms have both direct and complementary effects on supplier performance. Overall, a firm's technical expertise was the most general driver of supplier performance. But both relational and contractual elements of supplier governance mechanisms also influenced supplier performance, most strikingly in the ability to engender cooperative relationships and, in combination, on price performance. Hence, firms can neither successfully neglect technical expertise nor ignore governance mechanisms, but need both types of skills.
The study has several conceptual implications for the governance literature. First, this work highlights the need for firms to maintain their technical skills even as they outsource to maintain adequate performance across multiple elements of activities. This finding highlights
Richardson's conceptual discussion of technical skills being developed both through internal experience and through cooperation with suppliers and other firms (Richardson, 1972) . It also reinforces conclusions from a small set of empirical studies about the importance of internal technical skills in maintaining effective supply relationships (e.g., MacDuffie and Helper, 1997; Brusoni, et al., 2001 ). Perhaps it is these technical skills that offset the limits of effective relational governance in long term relationships (Poppo, Zheng Zhou, and Zenger, 2008) . Our results advance this literature by demonstrating an impact across a wider range of performance dimensions than prior research and by controlling for the initial decision to outsource, which prior studies do not address. Moreover, the fact that technical skills reinforce the benefits of relational governance for cooperation performance extends the technical skills arguments even further, as prior research has not systematically examined such interactions.
Second, this work speaks to relational governance and contractual governance arguments.
Relational governance mechanisms are an aspect of what Dyer and Singh (1998) refer to as a relational capability. The study increases our understanding of this relational capability and how it affects supplier performance, both alone and in conjunction with technical expertise. Relational governance influenced cooperation, delivery, and communication more directly than price or quality. It is possible that price and quality are more objective criteria that are less directly affected by relational mechanisms.
In turn, the results have nuanced implications for the contractual governance literature.
The lack of a main effect of contracting may appear to run counter to arguments by scholars such as Reuer and Ariño (2007) and Mayer and Teece (2008) , while the lack of an interaction with technical expertise may appear to conflict with results from Mayer and Salomon (2006) . The null results may arise because the relatively small firms in our study can select when to use contracts fairly effectively, as we noted above. Indeed, the fact that the item for appropriate use of contracts loads strongly within the relational governance construct speaks to this conclusion.
Instead, performance differences arise from the harder to manage activities that underlie technical expertise and relational governance. At the same time, the bimodal impact of contracting on price performance that we discussed earlier -benefits that arise when firms combine contracting with relational governance as opposed to problems when firms attempt to rely on contracts alone -helps tease out the conflicting arguments about contracts, in which some scholars, such as those we cited above, predict benefits while others (e.g., Ghoshal and Moran, 1996) expect problems. A key point from our study is that the benefits of contracts are most likely to occur in combination with relational governance, while using contracts alone may sometimes actually create constraints that inhibit performance.
The industry context produces insights. Our firms were small, with less economic power than those often discussed in outsourcing or systems integration studies. It is possible that technical expertise and relational governance are particularly critical to supplier management for such firms, because they cannot rely on bargaining power to generate positive results.
The survey has several limits that suggest avenues for continuing research. The data are cross-sectional with only the buyer as the respondent. Because sourcing is a dynamic process, consisting of many stages, and because relationships develop over time, it would be interesting to determine whether the results also arise longitudinally. It would also be informative to gain the perspective of the supplier to determine whether they view the buyer as being technically or managerially skilled. We were somewhat constrained by having subjective performance
measures. An alternate explanation to our results would be that satisfactory supplier performance involves appropriate expectations, such that buyers with closer supply relationships will know more about their suppliers and thus be less likely to be dissatisfied with the suppliers'
performance. However, our strong and more general results for technical expertise over relational governance as well as our two stage approach suggest that the results do not reflect self-fulfilling prophecies, but rather that technically competent firms appear to be better at selecting and managing suppliers. Nonetheless, it would be insightful to understand how both parties develop performance expectations and how expectations relate to more objective measures of performance. Although price, quality, delivery, communication, and cooperation are important to all buyers, it would be interesting to explore the relationships between technical expertise and governance for other types of performance, such as innovativeness.
Several extensions to this work would broaden our understanding of supply relationships.
Research could investigate the effect of relationship duration and prior exchanges on performance when also incorporating technical and governance skills. Fine-grained empirical work on the details of the contracts (Mayer and Weber, 2005; Ryall and Sampson, 2007) , along with a better understanding of the specific relationship dynamics within a particular dyad, could help uncover what specific features of contractual and relational governance complement or conflict with each other. Further theory development can consider how specific aspects of relational governance affect different types of performance, potentially building upon empirical work by Krause et al. (2007) . We note that the choice of sourcing mode was significant for some types of performance (quality and delivery), but not others; this suggests that there could be different mechanisms at work, one requiring a more complex model (including relational contractual considerations) and another simply requiring technical skills. It would be enlightening to use qualitative or other fine-grained techniques of data collection to better understand these mechanisms and processes.
Research could also assess generalizability to other settings, such as retail or service industries or sectors with larger firms or more technological volatility. It would be instructive to consider how firms manage multiple suppliers, including internal production, to determine how governance features may differ between suppliers. It would also be fascinating to unpack the expertise construct, determining if different kinds of expertise (e.g., process vs. product) have contingent effects on performance, how these may relate to the choice of sourcing mode, and if diminishing returns exist.
As firms increasingly outsource key components, they need to understand how to manage supplier relationships. This study demonstrates the importance of both technical expertise and governance activities for supplier performance. In sum, firms must maintain a multidimensional internally and externally-focused exchange system to successfully manage supplier relationships. 
